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Abstract 
comprehended, if not completely, then at least in several of its fundamental characteristics, as a vast project of inventing, 
critical assessment of the ethical 
not 
only an important transformation in our understanding of the history of ethics and also of the history of subjectivity, but to 
 
biopolitical normalization. In or
roots of the violent rejection, coming from 
only a more or less sterile exercise in critical th -
ethical and social practices whose goal is to favor the self-fashioning of individuals and/or a spiritual conversion of a sort. I 
will suggest that a complete rebuttal of this ancient vision of philosophy could be seen as a perfect illustration of the complex 
web of power/knowledge relations that structure the philosophical and cultural paradigm dominant nowadays, one that 
eventually reduces philosophy to nothing more than a  
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prove to be quite a controversial endeavor, given the fact that the intellectual and philosophical trajectory of the 
French thinker has been subject to various interpretations, including those coming from 
each spiral of his research, Foucault has read the previous turn as in fact dealing with what the next one professed 
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[1]. He reconsidered his earlier archaeologies of knowledge as ,  but he 
also saw his genealogies of strategic power relations in the context of different coercive practices as ultimately 
having to do not with an anal
culture, human beings are made subjects [ ] Thus it is not power, but the subject, which is the general theme of 
 claims Foucault in one of his most illuminating late texts [2]. And yet, in the introduction to the 
second volume of the History of Sexuality, published shortly before his death, Foucault states that his long-life 
interest was ,  presenting the three stages of his work as dealing 
  then in their 
g 
[3]. 
I think it is important to acknowledge that the French thinker shared with Heidegger, probably the most 
influential silent source of his work, the strong rejection of a Cartesian subject understood as the original 
principle and the final ground for experience and action, at the same time maintaining a deep commitment to the 
idea of human freedom (thus distancing himself from Nietzsche, his major source of inspiration).1 
view, the subject is no longer an absolute point, the condition of possibility for all experience, but merely a kind 
practices and techniques by which human beings come to recogniz
power relations, but also of ethical relationships to the self, come to be tied to a distinct personal, social and 
cultural identity and, on this ground, articulate statements that are recognized as true in a given context. We could 
etc.), nor for the truth in the classic sense  whether we conceive it as a form of correspondence, coherence or as 
an original disclosure  but rather for the (historical) relationship between subjectivity and truth2. 
This relationship is always considered to involve a set of practices, techniques, procedures, rituals, etc. having 
to do with the making of the truth and by the same movement with the subjectivation of individuals, by way of 
linking a particular kind of truth discourse to a particular kind of subject (the result of a specific mode of relating 
 work concerns the different alternatives, illustrated 
by the history of culture and European society, of subjectivation and veridiction. Thus, his goal is ultimately an 
ethical and political one. On 
merely the result of a biopolitical subjectivation (combining disciplinary techniques with scientific forms of 
classification), by way of acknowledging the contingences and the arbitrariness operating in modern societies and 
shapi , on a personal or 
rather interpersonal level, 
 without which the very functioning of a democratic regime runs the risk of giving birth to new forms of 
 (see also [4]). And I think this is the ultimate goal that explains 
 
1 Foucault (1997) states that power relations are possible only insofar as the subjects are free[ ]if there are relations of power in every 
[5]. For an acknowledgment of the tremendous yet different importance of both 
Nietzsche and H [6]. For an assessment of the differences between Nietzsche and the 
final Foucault regarding their conceptions of ethics, human relationships and freedom, see, for instance, [7]; [8]. Nevertheless, it should be 
noticed that Foucault never understood freedom as an essential property of a rational and autonomous agent (which would have implied the 
acceptance of a humanism explicitly rejected). He rather conceived power and freedom, in their perpetual opposition but also mutual 
dependence, as having their roots in two basic impulses or drives of any given individual: on one hand, the impulse to influence and control 
the conduct of others and of oneself; on the other hand, an inborn stubbornness or tendency to disobey, to reject conformism, discipline and 
rules of conduct. 
2 been 
interested in this problem, even if I framed it somewh  [5].  Also see [9]. 
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 of the self 
[3]. 
So what is the place occupied by the theme of souci de soi in the context of thi
(in the sense that the archaeological discursive regularities designated positions for 
virtual subjectivities or power-knowledge made individualsm),
he ground of a 
 [10]? I think there are two complementary ways of approaching this matter, one of them 
extremely careful to historical discontinuities, while the other one remains faithful to the philosophical continuity 
or the general orientation of ancient philosophy i  inspired by Hadot and other historians of 
ancient thought. 
 It can be argued, as Fr. Gros (2004) does, that, in his final years, Foucault approached three historical 
ways of ethical subjectivation, i.e. of establishing and maintaining a constant relationship to the self on the basis 
of a particular truth discourse: the confession or the Christian hermeneutics of the self, the Greek and Roman 
philosophical care of the self and the Cynical parrhêsia or fearless speech. 
Foucault regards the slow elaboration of self-exegesis through the sacrament of penitence and the direction of 
conscience in the first Christian monasteries as actually being synonymous with the historical emergence of a 
 (coupé) moral subject, 
necessarily interminable task of constituting itself as the object of an obsess  [11]. 
Foucault emphasiz  of the Christian ethics and also the source of the 
modern difficulties of g  sense of the self: the fact that this hermeneutics of 
the self in its original Christian sense was not an end in itself, but merely a step towards the renunciation of the 
self, the kenotic movement of the purified soul that offers itself to the love of God. 
 subject of Christian ethics, the care of the self in the Greek and Roman philosophical 
tradition would have involved an ethical s  separated by itself only by the 
 [11]. The self is thereby conceived 
not as an original secret, but as a final work in regard to which th  that is uneducated, 
philosophically untrained, remains in a kind of gap. It is no longer, or rather not yet, a subject of introspection, 
,  aiming at a complete self-mastery or possession of 
the self. Fundamentally, the care of the self would not have been about self-discovery but rather about self-
creation or self- ,
web of social practices and discourses that equally express and constitute this self whic
 [12]. 
regarding his life as a raw material that has to be shaped by rules of conduct. The fundamental philosophical 
existence:   but the effort to make visible in the flow of existence the 
[11]. Care of the 
[13]); it also means a regulated form of the existence, the harmony between words and deeds, instilled through a 
visibility of justice and other spiritual principles of conduct in our daily life. The ancient model of epimeleia 
heautou or philosophical ascesis seems to provide us with a challenging alternative: instead of an objectification 
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[14]; inste  self3. So an aesthetics of existence fitted for our 
discourse, that is on the effort of radically changing our lives and ways of being in accordance to a fully 
embraced model (in Antiquity, this was regarded as the life of the sage). 
 outlined by Foucault in contrast to the Christian confession is the Cynical 
parrhêsia (a word translated into Latin by libertas), meaning freedom of speech, the bold, even brutal frankness of 
publicly stating the inconvenient truths about our daily existence. This existential attitude, which is the mark of 
the sage, of the spiritual master, is taken to the li
transfo 0], challenging his fellows to radically 
elation to the truth is no longer 
constituted, in this case, by introspection and unconditional obedience to the spiritual father, nor by an ethical 
work on the self aiming, as in the case of Stoics or Epicureans, to ensure a harmonic correspondence between 
o the very limit of its 
]
fellows by his subversive discourse, irritating them by his explosions of honesty. 
But the highlighting of historical discontinuities does not end here. Even in the narrow sense outlined above, 
the care of the self would have involved three different stages: (A) a Presocratic stage focu
 understood not as a narcissistic retreat into a private world, but as a relation to truth in the sense of 
, a 
- [1]; (B) a 
Socratic and Platonic care of the self whose main theme becomes the knowledge of the self and the purity of the 
soul, thus preparing the way for the modern relationship between subjectivity and truth 4 ; (C) finally, the 
is de-intellectualized insofar as it does not resolve itself into pure theôria  
ordeal (épreuve  [11]. 
Nevertheless, this is only one way of looking at the care of the self. From a different, broader perspective, 
ded, if 
not completely, then at least in several of its fundamental characteristics, as a vast project of inventing, defining, 
 5 [12].  
Foucault shares with P. Hadot the view acc
philosophy did not consist of the elaboration, the teaching, of theory. The goal of the Greek schools of 
 [15]. In the beginning of his 1982 lectures at the Collège de 
ethics of the self, as well as the Cynical parrhêsia. The hypothesis he is endorsing is precisely the following: 
-thousand-year development from the appearance of the first forms of the philosophical attitude in the 
 
3 gnomé designates the unity of will and knowledge; it designates also a brief piece of discourse through which truth appeared 
with all its force and encrusts itself in the soul of people. Then, we could say that even as late as the first century A.D., the type of subject 
which is proposed as a model and as a target in the Greek, or in the Hellenistic or Roman philosophy, is a gnomic self, where force of the 
 [15]. 
4 By comparing two Platonic dialogues, Alcibiades and Laches
offers evidence for a stylistic of life even as he argues  [1]. 
5 In fact, the entire first part of  .  Consecrated by 
Socrates, the theme of the care for the self would have been centre 
claimed to be,  according to Foucault [16]. 
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Greeks to the first forms of Christian asceticism  from the fifth century B.C. to the fifth century A.D.  can be 
 [14]. 
From this general perspective, the care of the self could be regarded as the key to distinguish between ancient 
spirituality and modern rationality, between the traditional practices involved in the activity of taking care of 
thought that[ ]attempts to determine the condition [ ]then I think 
 [14]. As suggested by Flynn (2005), 
two distinct notions of truth are here colliding: on one hand, a spiritual and existential understanding of the truth; 
 and objective notion that has prevailed in modern sciences and has oriented 
theoretical philosophy since the times of Descartes [9]. From the point of view of epimeleia heautou, the truth 
6, promising us instead 
some kind of liberation or salvation. 
The key element that has to be noticed when analyzing the notion of epimeleia heautou is the fact that it 
involved not only a permanent relationship to the self, as well as an attitude of constant vigilance and attention to 
the present, but also 
changes, purifies, transf  and exercises of thought, in a very generic sense, aimed 
at producing chniques of meditation, of memorization of the past, of 
7 [14]. This is the 
level of what P. Hadot had called, ,  and this is what Foucault is 
,  thus extending the Habermasian triangle (techniques of 
production  techniques of signification  techniques of domination) that had constituted his main concern until 
[15]; [17]). This technology of the self is essential in order to grasp the practical dimension 
of ancient philosophy, as well as its fundamental ethical and political end.  
At this point, it is important to acknowledge not merely the existence of a therapeutic dimension of ancient 
Roman age, in an extremely close analogy with medical thought and practice [16]  e for 
  education  Aubenque) and the 
 (P. Hadot)  these three forms being nothing else than the three compartments of the 
8 [18], I would say that care of the self, 
 
6 slow 
disengagement of the question: how, on what conditions can one think the truth? from the question: how, at what cost, in accordance with 
what procedure, must the subject's mode of being be changed for him to have access to the truth?  [14]. 
7 It should be noted that by translating the Foucauldian souci de soi led for two reasons. First, as 
souci is not just care in the sense of an affectionate concern fo  but also a kind of anxiety [12]. 
care of the  which, unlike epimeleia heautou, cura 
sui or souci de soi - s challenging thesis is precisely that 
 [15]: not a pre-given nature, merely the effect of a reflexive 
 -
because we have come to a historical and cultural stage when we no longer conceive our identity in -given reality  but rather 
-  that self-care understood as auto-poesis or self-
W  but perhaps the only ethical ative we continue to recog  [8]. 
8 The descrip  (animi medicina) is found in Cicero, who was actually expressing a very 
 s [18]; t
 is an expression employed by P. Aubenque to describe the Aristotelian ethics of virtue and also the meaning of moral education 
for Plato [20] the practical use of logic according to the Stoics; for an 
account of the three areas of the Stoic philosophical exercises, see [19]. 
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according to various doctrines and schools developed in Antiquity, involves a philosophical diagnostic of human 
misery, an ideal norm of health (a rather open-ended conception about happiness), a method of clinical 
itual exercises of 
antiquity, at the same time separating them from the philosophical or mythical discourse which came along with 
 [19], I argue that without the complete adherence to a particular vision of the world, to a particular truth 
embraced by a philosophical or religious school, no matter what, the practice of spiritual exercises proves to be 
the form of the will ], seems to be a more accurate account of the philosophical self-formation. 
Foucault goes on ask  was the fundamental statement of ancient 
 -knowledge [14]? The historians warn us that, initially, the Delphic precept 
gnôthi seauton was only a technical advice concerning the kind of questions you addressed the Oracle, which 
philosophical stage through the leg
nature of your rational soul, without involv  With respect to the technique of the 
examination of conscience, Foucault argues that it was not origin
actions (see [15]; [11]). Nevertheless, if gnôthi seauton was only one aspect of this complex philosophical 
pract  how is it that our histories usually mention only the former? 
One way of answering it, inspired by Hadot, would be that Christianity, presenting itself, through the writings 
of the first apologists and fathers 
functions of ancient philosophy, adapting or discovering on its own many of the spiritual exercises. Then, in the 
Middle Ages, philosophical research mainly reduced its activity to the task of providing conceptual tools for 
theology. After many centuries, when philosophy finally regained its autonomy and its old status, it found itself 
in a very different cultural context from that of Antiquity, unavoidably inheriting a strict partition of disciplines 
and, most of all, the decisive separation between theoretical disciplines and life conduct. So it can be argued, as 
Flynn does, that the destiny of European philosophy has actually engaged the split of two principles originally 
conceived in a very close relationship, even co-
anthropology, philosophy of mind, and the like, conveyed by a detached mode of reflection and an antiseptic 
Cynics toward such non-academic domains of self-
training, and psychological counselling ]. 
of 
(our access to) truth. On  is clearly something a bit disturbing for us in this 
principle of the care ]. The reason is our Christian heritage, which makes as to regard moral 
actions in terms of a strictly altruistic conduct, with the risk of neglecting the fact that care of the self originally 
involved the care for the others as well. Another aspect of this matter has to do with what Foucault regards as the 
prohibitions at the expense of ascetics and ethical work on ourselves [3]. On the other hand, the obnubilation of 
epimeleia heautou is directly linked to what the French thinker, in an openly admitted conventional manner, calls 
; his memo
subject and truth begin when it is postulated that, such as he is, the subject is capable of truth, but that, such as it 
is, the truth canno 4]. 
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It has to be 
,  [19]. 
 thus reaching a kind of cosmic consciousness, 
Foucault would have sought to identif  in late Antiquity, 
motivated by his aspiration to tra work of art.  Following this line of interpretation, 
we could state that Foucault was in fact only interested in providing the conceptual framework for a self-creation 
-subjectivation, of the ethical 
fortification (renforcement) of the self by itself, etc., while marginalizing the spiritual exercises of the dissolution 
of the subject in a cosmic totality ]. Unlike Foucault, Hadot was a self- agnostic myst  that 
focused on self-knowledge understood as a release from the individual and an access to the universal, as an 
awareness of the fact that y :  in other words, as a way of trans-
th historically questionable and too 
t of view [21]. 
It is generally admitted that Hadot provides a more accurate account of the ancient philosophy 9, while 
Foucault is mainly interested 
bringing forth a frame of subjectivation focused on the freedom of human beings to invent new styles of 
existence. P. Veyne points out that Foucault actually judged G
impossible to resuscitate[ ]; but he considered one of its elements, namely the idea of a work of the self on the 
self, to be capable of reac  [22]. hetic of 
singular genius to embellish ordinary life, as it may be the case with the Wildean dandy or even 
 but it rather targets the instilled harmony between logoi and erga in accordance with the Greek 
ideal of the beautiful-good (kalos kagathos) 10
ê tou biou in terms of an aesthetics of existence shows 
his deep conviction that the age of moral theories based on universally applicable codes of rules is now over and 
that we should try to see the ethical work (travail) on ourselves in a closer analogy with the work of an artist that 
does not rely on any eternal standards of good taste and is forced to experience various creative methods 
 [23] 
is inseparable from the sensus communis  [12], the same can be said 
 be completed work-in-  [8]. So it 
e aesthetics of existence always takes place in, and responds to, a 
 [12]. 
 I believe this to be one of the main reasons for rejecting the general views expressed in the 80s and the 
anti- ]. In fact, the very mentioning 
ver
effect of techniques of separation, isolation, individuation, and differentiati  [12]. 
 
9 A. Davidson beli  hat sometimes 
sis of ancient 
ethics, we can better see the abyss that separates psuchê from any possible estheticization of the sel  [25]. The same criticism may be found 
in Pradeau, who also elaborates on an idea shared by many scholars, according 
[26]. This kind of general critique involving 
both Foucault and Hadot will be addressed in the final part of the present study. 
10 See Plato, Republic, 402d  403b and Xenophon, Cyropaedia, VIII, 1, 33, cited by Foucault [3]. 
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And this is precisely what I think 
an   
As Fr. Gros 
integrated in the social fabric and constitute  [11]. If politics had to begin with care 
of the self according to Socrates, it may be argued that, in his final years, Foucault comes to see the techniques of 
the self first elaborated in the Greek philosophy as an antidote for modern disciplinary techniques having their 
self-discovery in the context of today, Foucault holds that the idea of con  conceived 
as an art of self-fashioning r  to biopolitical normalization [14]. So 
philosophy as care of the self becomes a key element in the struggle for a modern subjectivity, a struggle that 
involves, on one hand, the resistance to normalization and, on the other hand, the resistance to solitude or 
life, forces the individual back on himself and ties him to his own  [2]. It is thus 
essential not to forget that in its Socratic or Stoic context, the care of the self did no ,
al  
d political [11]. It should be added that the care of 
the self have always supposed a partner the figure of the master of existence,  the one helping me to learn how 
 and that for a Greek or a Roman philosopher, the care of the self cannot be separated from the care for 
ently social 
activities: conversations, correspondences, teaching and apprenticeship in the schools, 
[11].  [19], all of them supposed a 
dialogical structure, implicit if not explicit: they involved an intensification of the attention and a permanent 
dialogue with oneself as well as the others. 
There is yet another tendency than can be noticed among outstanding representatives of academic philosophy, 
one that not only regards Foucault as a narcissistic individualist (L. Ferry, A. Renaut, etc.) or denies the critical 
power of his analysis (Ch. Taylor, J. Habermas, etc.), but that is strongly rejecting the very notion of philosophy 
care of the self.  In a study intended to be a critical response to my 2010 book Philosophy as 
a Way of Life: The Sources of Authenticity  denies any validity of this metaphilosophical 
perspective [27]. It seems to me that his strong criticisms can be placed in two distinct categories. The first 
involves the actual network of power/knowledge relations that configures the cultural and philosophical paradigm 
dominant nowadays, a paradigm focused on understanding the philosophical activity as being nothing more and 
as the institutional pitfalls, that the vision supported by both Hadot and Foucault would engage, encouraging 
philosophical vulgarization and amateurism, Nietzschean vitalism, the lack of study and critical thinking. A 
uld correspond, at the most, only to a possible application of philosophy, 
which is the philosophical consultancy
one. The second objection is of historical or historiographical k  to a 
type of Neostoicism and accusing the lack of textual evidence to support the importance of this existential 
concern throughout the history of philosophy.  
I think this last objection may be challenged by arguin
 has always been a constitutive mark of philosophy [28] and, even more, that it 
denotes a tension noticeable in the thought of almost every major philosopher. Plato has spoken about spiritual 
conversion (periagôgês technê) as the goal of philosophy in his Republic (518d), also claiming, at least in the 
Seventh Letter (341c-e), that his philosophy was not captured by any discourse. Aristotle states in his Politics that 
the theoretical activities are also practical in the sense of self-transformation (1325b); in the Nicomachean Ethics, 
that this is the 
way to be good[ ]are rather like patients who listen carefully to their doctors, but do not 
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(1105b) [29]. Even Kant claims at some point that the philosophers from Antiquity, who were concerned with 
s remained much more faithful to the true Idea of the 
philosopher than has been the case in modern times, when we encounter the philosopher only as an artist of 
]. 
As to the first objection, it is my belief that we are confronted with a perfect illustration of the risk involved in 
otential of 
philosophy, both for individuals and for the social reality, but also tends to obliterate the very meaning of 
philosophical creation, whether we speak about self-fashioning through philosophical practices or simply about 
the creation of new concepts and truth discourses.  
[ ]for philosophy to 
find its reality it must be practice (both in the singular and plural, a practice and practices); the reality of 
philosophy is found in its practices  stated Foucault in his 1983 course at Collège de France, while commenting 
 [30]. And it might be true that our efforts, today, in changing our metaphilosophical views 
and trying to conceive the nature of philosophy not as a body of theories having possible applications, but as a set 
of social practices (most of which having, of course, an eminently discursive or dialogical character) go hand in 
spen ethic o  
suitable for our late modernity [14]. 
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